The post 2014 scenario in Afghanistan is broadly portrayed as a nightmare. While U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in his recent visit to Pakistan has already hinted a “draw-down”, there are widespread apprehensions among the analysts of repetition of the early 1990’s civil war with ethnic, religious, sectarian and proxy war contenders for the thrown of Kabul. The picture is further portrayed fizzy as U.S–Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement is yet to evolve into a comprehensive bilateral agreement about the possible presence of US troops in Afghanistan after 2014.
Whatever the situation might be one thing is sure that the three countries US, Afghanistan and Pakistan are either the direct beneficiaries of any peace-building process or they will be bearing the brunt of a possible long-term continuation of the conflict and terrorism. In the last 10 years or so we have been witnessing distrust on either side of the Afghanistan-Pakistan-United States (Af-Pak-US) triangle and it is important to learn lessons from the past before embarking on any post-2014 journey for the region.
Significant in this regard is US model of the Af-Pak. Since the term was first used by Richard Holbrooke, the Obama administration’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the region was conceived as a “single theatre of operation” to “disrupt, dismantle and prevent” Al-Qaeda. But the term had other implications too. It was supposed to serve as a democratic model to slowly and gradually bring democratic forces in the two countries together through people-to-people contact, businesses and to some extent military partnership. It was probably envisioned that democracies in the two neighboring countries will open up avenues for dialogue, mediation and reconciliation and thus reducing the chances for not-state actors to have sanctuaries in either of the countries. However, lacking the vision both Karzai and Zardari administrations fell prey to their internal political compulsions and cooperation between the two countries could not evolve. Consequently both the countries blame each other of sponsoring terrorism and interference and due to which many areas of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are now virtually under the control of the Taliban.
The Af-Pak model was conceived in the broader regional and international interests of the super power i.e. the US. However, like all plans challenges surface when it comes to implementation. The plan largely depended on the holistic processes that have been shaped by diverse factors within the triangle as well as with the inclusion and exclusion of other players regionally and internationally. One such intrusion in the triangle is the Indian influence in Afghanistan and its support and training for the Afghan National Security Forces. This will remain the bone of contention between Afghanistan and Pakistan until the tension between India and Pakistan is normalized to the extent that it may not disturb the trust between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Otherwise the security apparatus in Pakistan will continue its reluctance to go after terrorists’ sanctuaries on the pretext that growing Indian influence in Afghanistan will greatly undermine Pakistan’s own security concerns not only on the eastern border but also on the western side and beyond the Durand Line.
The current apprehensions are largely founded on the impression that Afghanistan is largely dependent on international security assistance and if such assistance is withdrawn, non-state actors would not only be able to destabilize the country but will also ignite ethnic, religious and proxy conflicts. It is, therefore, very important to scientifically calculate the strength and weakness of the Afghan state, its economy, its security apparatus and the magnitude of threats it is supposed to face in case of a possible withdrawal of international assistance. Significant in this regards is Afghan Presidential election to be held in April 2014. We had been witnessing in the previous elections that electorate was manipulated and massive rigging and corruptions scandals were reported. Afghans want peace and prosperity and free, fair and transparent elections would be the key to bring creative and constructive leadership to the front who would be able to deliver in times of extreme crisis.
While we may yet to decide between a “withdrawal” and a “draw-down” by the US, one thing is imminent that the NATO forces are supposed to withdraw and they will need the same route through which they have been provided all the supply. In the recent past NATO supply has been continually halted by terrorists’ attacks and by Pakistan’s own security concerns. Moreover, the right-wing political parties in Pakistan are specifically mindful of this supply line and some of them are now ruling Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These supply lines pass through FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Pashtun areas of Baluchistan. In these areas Taliban operatives have sanctuaries, networks and parallel governments. These areas are politically marginalized and have been partially devastated by terrorism, military operations, internal displacement and natural disasters. In the past these areas have been largely neglected and were not made stakeholders in the decision-making process. It is, therefore, pertinent to mention that in the wake of NATO‘s withdrawal we may likely to see challenges of unprecedented magnitude which may totally or substantively jeopardize peace in the region.
The possibility for sustainable peace exists within the Afghan-Pakistan-US (Af-Pak-US) triangle and trust deficit on each side of this triangle has devastating implications not only for the three countries but also for the entire region. It is quite obvious that an Afghan, an American and a Pakistani are suffering from lack of peace or conversely they will benefit from peace. The choice is simple.
Published on the website: http://angelmerisi.com/2013/09/af-pak-us-triangle-and-2014-scenario/
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