Ideological diversions

Power operates through media in very ingenious ways. The media may present a conflict between two minority groups. It further inflates the conflict and thus diverts attention from exploiters, usurpers and the corrupt.

Recently I wrote a blog about my perceptions on the education system of Pakistan and the way rot- learning and poor teaching-learning process of science is creating careerists who are failing to run the institutions. A friend recommended me to send the blog to Express Tribune. I did the same but surprisingly I was told that the blog did not fit into the policy lines of the paper. May be the concerned person had not read the article or may be this was exactly their policy. In any case, I have observed that the paper encourages an ideological propaganda of the seculars, liberals or leftists. There’s little room for objective analysis of issues.

In Malala’s case I have been engaged with the liberals in a variety of talks. I have been telling them that making an ideological war of Malala is an over-exaggeration of her mission and that if we restrict ourselves to her mission of education for all girls it would be more pragmatic. However, the temptation of making Malala as symbol of resistance was so great for them and they were so much obsessed with this thinking that I had to remain silent. Such portrayal of Malala not only led to further polarization but also diverted many from her original mission of “education for all girls.”

A similar ideological conflict can be witnessed between the PTI and ANP in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Sanity demands that both the parties must work in close collaboration in such a way that the former learns from the experiences of the later and the later cooperates with the former on the pretext of bringing stability to a terrorism-affected province. When I advocate such a mutual and democratic cooperation on social media I am not encouraged.  For both the government and the opposition an ideological conflict is more fruitful as genuine grievances of the people are set aside and the parties’ interests are in the news.

There are also many ideologues who misinterpret relationship between the power and the required resistance. For example, one of my communist friends on facebook did not like Malala because she had not spoken against imperialism in her UN speech. Such an ideological resistance model is counter-productive and it does not empathize with the power-holders. Without empathizing with the power-holders we cannot know what the power-holders perceive. In other words ideological abstraction of the resisting groups is merely a diversion and it helps more those in power than those who are supposed to resist.

Capitalism as criticized by the communists or which is termed as “rentier and investor” by its proponents is the prevailing economic system.  Democracies in this system hugely rely on money. Academia is sponsored by industries and in turn industries make more profits from academic research. The media itself is mostly commercial. Power operates through media in very ingenious ways. The media may present a conflict between two minority groups. It further inflates the conflict and thus diverts attention from exploiters, usurpers and the corrupt.

It is not surprising that there is enough room for the distortion of facts and propaganda of non-issues. I don’t suggest a communist alternative. I am describing what the system is all about.

Identity Crisis and Pakhtun Nationalism

The term “identity crisis” was first coined by Erik Homburger Erikson (15 June 1902 – 12 May 1994) was a German-born American developmental psychologists. He used the term for “ego identity during adolescence.”  According to him if an individual fails to form a positive self-image during resolving a number of crisis in adolescence—our ideas of ourselves and what other think of us—the person will be having less confidence to confront problems during adulthood.

The term has wider usages and it is also used in history and politics. Historian K.K. Aziz has used this term for the Muslims of British India who after losing the grandeur of the recent past (Mughal Empire) felt isolated and could not reassert themselves as Indians.

Are Pakhtuns suffering from identity crisis? Dr. Fazal Rahim Marwat has rightly said that due to political domination, Anglo-Afghan Wars and the subsequent treaties Pakhtuns were divided and a crisis of identity was imposed. What was this crisis of identity?

I think Identity Crisis of a nation implies that a nation has a negative self-image. In the case of Pakhtuns we know the reasons that excessive stereotyping on the part of our traditional enemies and the wars on our land have been forcing us to adapt ourselves to this negative self-image. Thus identity crisis may be an imposed negative self-image which is restricting the ways of peace and progress in Pakhtunkhwa.

One of the major symptoms of this negative-self image is lack of empathy for fellow Pakhtuns. There was a time when Pakhtuns did not feel comfortable among outsiders. Even outside Pakhtunkhwa and Afghanistan Pakhtuns would used to live with other Pakhtuns. Now this empathy among Pakhtuns is replaced with feeling of shame, guilt, mutual distrust and self-destructive attitudes. These are some of the reasons due to which Pakhtun intelligence is largely nationalist or ethnocentric i.e. building a positive self-image and pushing people towards progress and prosperity.  

Dialogue ends before it starts

After passing of the joint resolution by the All Parties Conference (APC) on September 9, 2013 in favour of a dialogue process with the militants, three big terrorists’ incidents have taken place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: Killing of 3 senior officers of the Pakistan Army including a Major General on September 15, two suicide attacks on All Saints’ Memorial Church on September 22 and Qessa Khwani Bazar’s explosion on September 29.

Meanwhile, PM Nawaz Sharif, while addressing to the 68th session of the General Assembly at UN headquarters on September 27 urged upon the US to stop drone strikes. Another stronger statement was issued by PTI’s Chief Imran Khan later on October 4 wherein he demanded the government to take the issue of drone strikes to UN Security Council.

Soon after PM’s speech in the UN four suspected militants were killed in drone strikes in North Waziristan. Taliban’s spokesman Shahidullah Shahid termed these attacks as violation of ceasefire because according to him drones attacks were carried out with the tacit support of the Pakistani government. It should be reminded that right now no military operation in any part of Pakistan is being conducted against the militants.

The political leadership in Pakistan is trying its best to create an environment for dialogues but the Tahreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is more pragmatic in its approach. The Taliban know that a dialogue process with the Pakistan government would be a futile exercise as according to them the US presence in Afghanistan would continue to be a major hurdle in their aims and objectives and that the US would continue striking them through drones. Thus they continue their destruction against the Pakistani state and its people.

The US on the other hand has a very clear policy about drone strikes. It favours a significant decrease in drone strikes but it has very categorically expressed its continuation till the end of 2014 and may be beyond. The drones are so far very successful from US point of view in rooting out key Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants.

The US has mostly ignored the peace deals with the militants by the Pakistan Army but it had pressurized the provincial government of ANP not to have any peace deal with the militants in Swat. It may be that the US does not want a political recognition of the Taliban by Pakistan. It may also be the case that the US has no such authority to initiate and accept a dialogue process without the prior consent of the democratic government in Afghanistan. The collapse of recent peace talks of the US and Afghan Taliban suggests that Afghan government would never allow the US to give recognition to Taliban without forcing them to accept the constitution of Afghanistan. Thus without having an intra-Afghan dialogue process, an intra-Pakistan dialogue process is unimaginable and the TTP would never agree with a dialogue process until Pakistani government forces the US to stop drone strikes.

Pakistan is a poor economy and its political leadership is too weak to have full control on state institutions. Therefore, it is less likely that Pakistan would be able to persuade the international community to end drone strikes. Even if US agrees on ending drone strikes it would ask for our commitment to force Taliban to accept the constitution of Afghanistan. The later is just a remote possibility.

Thus the APC’s recommendations would be having little impacts on changing the status quo. However, procrastination on the part of Pakistan in either initiating a dialogue process or a full-scale military operation may likely to give the militants an upper-hand in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. We may likely to see the writ of the state further weakened on the peripheries and growing insecurity and economic melt-down in the center.

 The article appeared on http://www.cpcsp.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=71:top-story-2&catid=35:stories

Instability and Polarization

While in Pakistan one may find that in almost every mosque during Friday Prayers’ sermon there is a mention of Jehad. On a busy road in Islamabad you will see the road is closed by some Lashkars (militant group) demonstrating some so-called religious rights. Outside the press club building one may see a group of bearded people having some pro-Syria banners attempting media attraction. There are religious seminaries with poor students spread in the nook and corner of the countries. A university chancellor reveals the plot of 9/11 and the New World Order and from the same university hostel militants associated with Al-Qaeda are arrested. 

There is the so-called notorious land called FATA (notorious due to militants’ control and the marginalization of the locals). There is Waziristan where TTP Commander lives and TTP spokesman issues press releases and videos about Taliban. On certain occasion the so-called Afghan Taliban show their presence when some of them are transported to Doha for peace talks with the US. 

The All Parties Conference recommended peace talks with the militants. Imran Khan suggested an office for them. Fazlullah group released video of the killing of an army Major General. Peshawar bleeds. But… but...

1. We are not sure of who these terrorists are and what are their aims and objectives.
2. The discourse of right ends in conspiracy theories and main-stream population sympathetic to the right attribute these terrorists’ activities to outside agents such as infidel West, India and Israel. 
3. The discourse of left ends in an oversimplified argument that these terrorists are religious fundamentalist who want to occupy both Afghanistan and Pakistan and hence want to establish a Global Islamic Khilaft.
4. This polarization is only destabilizing the state and society and is posing further risks to regional and global peace.

My Last Wish

Perhaps to wish is to foresee
It’s not that it’s surely happened
Pashtun nation sets itself free
But resilience is born and ripened

The heroes stumbled but rose again
Tired of long battles, still fighting
Winning freedom and false hope to entertain
The muffled drums we ever be striking

T’s to tell you how just I feel
The last wish from each heart to steal

Pashtun Nationalist Movement

Historically, Pashtun Nationalist Movement has seen many upheavals. Historians like Syed Waqar Ali Shah indentifies the historical phases of this movement such as Pir Rokhan Tahreek, Khushal Khan Baba and Baacha Khan. Khan Abul Samad Khan Achakzai can also be considered as part of Baacha Khan Khudai Khidmatgar Tahreek though later on he parted his way and started his own party in the Southern Pakhtunkhwa. 

Roughly speaking the Pashtun Nationalists Movement is the political philosophy based on a shared history, language, land, ethnicity (predominantly Pashtuns are part of this movement) and culture. However, the philosophy never clearly articulated how Pashtuns on both side of the Durand Line could unite. In its heydays the movement shared common platform with the communists, however, after the fall of Soviet Union and the subsequent Civil War and Talibanization in Afghanistan the movement lost its popular support.

It was 9/11 which reinvigorated the movement and Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line began to articulate their genuine grievances vis-à-vis the War against Terror. A dominant portions of Pashtuns aspirations remained peace and rebuilding process in Afghanistan and the movement sharply paced itself against Talibanization and terrorism. In Pakistan two strands of this movement i.e. Awami National Party and Pakhtunkhwa Mili Awai Party were able to win elections in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Pashtuns areas of Baluchistan respectively. Thus Pashtuns nationalists emerged as dominant stakeholders in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

1. How do we see the recent growth of this movement with its different strands: Afghanistan, ANP and PMAP?

2. What future prospects do we see for this movement such as ideological points, policy matters and strategic interventions?

3. How does the present leadership relevant for the future of this movement?

2014: The Year of hope or despair

All depends on the U.S–Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement and the possible stay of some of the US forces in Afghanistan. Close to this partnership will be India’s future involvement in Afghanistan.

On the other hand there is wait and see policy in Pakistan. As usual the All Parties Conference and its recommendations have provided an opportunity to Pakistan to buy some time in the name of dialogue with the militants and thus helping it to wait til a final decision about withdrawal of NATO forces and draw-down of US troops.

Meanwhile the militants have been successful to make a very visible presence on the scene and the increased attacks on military and civilians indicate they are taking advantage of the situation.

What may likely to be the worst case scenario?

Procrastination on the part of Pakistan in either initiating a dialogue process or a full-scale military operation may likely to give the militants an upper-hand in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. We may likely to see the writ of the state further weakened on the peripheries and growing insecurity and economic melt-down in the center. To be more specific Pakistan is already passing through this phase and it won’t make any difference if there is increase in militants’ presence and further security threats. However, such scenario would greatly undermine NATO’s ability to withdraw safely which would mean not an end to this war but the beginning of another turbulent phase in the history of Af-Pak region and specifically FATA. In very extreme condition the US/ NATO will have no other option but to look for alternative withdrawal route such as from Iran.

Do we have a visible win-win situation to the perceived end-game in Afghanistan? Will the so-called stakeholders (even if we exclude Taliban for the time-being) have the potential to reach such an agreement? Isn't our present strategy of striving for a strong bargaining position in Afghanistan’s so-called end-game at the expense of destabilizing our own state and society a gamble?